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Abstract 
Given that Olympic Games held over the past decade each have cost USD 8.9 billion on average, the 
size and financial risks of the Games warrant study. The objectives of the Oxford Olympics study are 
to (1) establish the actual outturn costs of previous Olympic Games in a manner where cost can 
consistently be compared across Games; (2) establish cost overruns for previous Games, i.e., the 
degree to which final outturn costs reflect projected budgets at the bid stage, again in a way that 
allows comparison across Games; (3) test whether the Olympic Games Knowledge Management 
Program has reduced cost risk for the Games, and, finally, (4) benchmark cost and cost overrun for 
the Rio 2016 Olympics against previous Games. The main contribution of the Oxford study is to 
establish a phenomenology of cost and cost overrun at the Olympics, which allows consistent and 
systematic comparison across Games. This has not been done before. 
 
Main findings of the study are, first, that average actual outturn cost for Summer Games is USD 5.2 
billion (2015 level), and USD 3.1 billion for Winter Games. The most costly Summer Games to date 
are London 2012 at USD 15 billion; the most costly Winter Games Sochi 2014 at USD 21.9 billion. 
The numbers cover the period 1960-2016 and include only sports-related costs, i.e., wider capital 
costs for general infrastructure, which are often larger than sports-related costs, have been excluded. 
 
Second, at 156 percent in real terms, the Olympics have the highest average cost overrun of any type 
of megaproject. Moreover, cost overrun is found in all Games, without exception; for no other type of 
megaproject is this the case. 47 percent of Games have cost overruns above 100 percent. The largest 
cost overrun for Summer Games was found for Montreal 1976 at 720 percent, followed by Barcelona 
1992 at 266 percent. For Winter Games the largest cost overrun was 324 percent for Lake Placid 
1980, followed by Sochi 2014 at 289 percent. 
 
Third, the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program appears to be successful in reducing 
cost risk for the Games. The difference in cost overrun before (166 percent) and after (51 percent) the 
program began is statistically significant.  
 
Fourth, and finally, the Rio 2016 Games, at a cost of USD 4.6 billion, appear to be on track to reverse 
the high expenditures of London 2012 and Sochi 2014 and deliver a Summer Games at the median 
cost for such Games. The cost overrun for Rio – at 51 percent in real terms, or USD 1.6 billion – is 
the same as the median cost overrun for other Games since 1999. 
 
Given the above results, for a city and nation to decide to stage the Olympic Games is to decide to 
take on one of the most costly and financially most risky type of megaproject that exists, something 
that many cities and nations have learned to their peril. 
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Why Study Cost and Cost Overrun at the Olympics? 
Given that the six most recent Olympic Games, held over the decade 2004-2014, have cost on average 
USD 8.9 billion – not including road, rail, airport, and hotel infrastructure, which often cost more than 
the Games themselves – the financial size and risks of the Games warrant study. Furthermore, a focus 
on cost overruns as compared to the original budget is critical for future host cities to understand the 
implications of the investment they are undertaking. As part of bidding for hosting the Games, the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) requires host cities and governments to guarantee that they 
will cover any cost overruns to the giant Olympics budgets. This means that the host city and nation 
are locked in to a non-negotiable commitment to cover any such increases. If overruns are likely this 
should clearly be taken into account in planning for the Games to get a realistic picture of the final 
outturn costs.  
 
Moreover, given the current global economic climate and subsequent tightening of government 
spending in many countries, understanding the implications of major investments like the Games is 
critical for governments to make sound fiscal and economic decisions about their expenditures. For 
instance, cost overrun and associated debt from the Athens 2004 Games weakened the Greek 
economy and contributed to the country's deep financial and economic crises, beginning in 2007 and 
still playing out almost a decade later (Flyvbjerg 2011). Similarly, in June 2016 – less than two 
months before the Rio 2016 opening ceremony – Rio de Janeiro's governor declared a state of 
emergency to secure additional funding for the Games. When Rio decided to bid for the Olympics, 
the Brazilian economy was doing well. Now, almost a decade later, costs were escalating and the 
country was in its worst economic crisis since the 1930's with negative growth and a lack of funds to 
cover costs. Other countries – and especially those with small and weak economies – may want to 
make sure they do not end up in a similar situation by having a realistic picture of costs and risks of 
cost overruns before they bid for the Olympic Games. The data presented in this paper will allow such 
assessment. 
 
Unfortunately, Olympics officials and hosts often misinform about the costs and cost overruns of the 
Games. For instance, in 2005 London secured the bid for the 2012 Summer Games with a cost 
estimate that two years later proved inadequate and was revised upwards with around 100 percent. 
Then, when it turned out that the final outturn costs were slightly below the revised budget, the 
organizers falsely, but very publicly, claimed that the London Games had come in under budget (BBC 
2013). Such deliberate misinformation of the public about cost and cost overrun treads a fine line 
between spin and outright lying. It is unethical, no doubt, but very common. We can therefore not 
count on organizers and governments to provide us with reliable information about the real costs and 
cost overruns of the Olympic Games. Independent studies are needed, like the one presented here. 
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Previous Studies of Cost and Cost Overrun 
Interest in cost and cost overrun of the Games has been high since the establishment of the modern 
Olympics in 1896. As long ago as 1911 Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the man responsible for 
establishing the modern Games, referred to "the often exaggerated expenses incurred for the most 
recent Olympiads" (Coubertin, 1911), and in 1973 Jean Drapeau, the mayor of Montreal, infamously 
stated "The Montreal Olympics can no more have a deficit, than a man can have a baby," which 
caused some peculiar cartoons in Canadian media when the Montreal Games developed a large deficit 
due to outsized cost overruns (CBC 2006).  Drapeau was wrong, and problems with cost and cost 
overrun are as prevalent today as they were in his time, and in Coubertin’s before him. 
 
Despite substantial interest in the cost of the Games, however, attempts to specifically and 
systematically evaluate such cost are few (Chappelet 2002, Essex and Chalkley 2004, Preuss 2004, 
Zimbalist 2015, Baade and Matheson 2016), while those that do attempt them are often focused on a 
specific Games (Bondonio and Campaniello 2006, Brunet 1995). Previous research on the cost of the 
Olympic Games has instead focused on whether the Games present a financially viable investment 
from the perspective of cost-benefit analysis. However, what to measure when determining the costs 
and benefits of the Games to a host country is open to debate and has varied widely between studies 
making it difficult to compare results across games. In particular, legacy benefits described in the bid 
are often intangible, and as such pose a difficulty in ex-post evaluations. The benefits of increased 
tourism revenue, jobs created by Olympic needs, or national pride are hugely varied and similarly 
difficult to quantify and compare. Costs are also hard to determine; for example, one could argue that 
if hotels in the host city have invested in renovations, and benefits of increased tourist revenues to 
those hotels are included in the analysis, then these costs should also be included in any accounting. 
Finally, the percentage of work that an employee in an outlying city spends on Games-related work 
would be exceptionally difficult to estimate. 
 
Preuss (2004) contains the perhaps most comprehensive multi-Games economic analysis to date, 
looking at the final costs and revenues of the Summer Olympics from 1972 to 2008. Preuss finds that 
since 1972 every Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG), which leads the planning of 
the Games in the host city, has produced a positive benefit as compared to cost, but only when 
investments are removed from OCOG budgets. This restricts the analysis narrowly to only OCOG 
activities, which typically represent a fairly small portion of the overall Olympic cost and therefore 
also denote too limited a view for true cost-benefit analysis. Further, other authors disagree with 
Preuss’ findings, and have suggested that the net economic benefits of the Games are negligible at 
best, and are rarely offset by either revenue or increases in tourism and business (Malfas, Theodoraki, 
and Houlihan 2004). Furthermore, none of these studies have compared projected cost to final cost, 
which is a problem, because evidence from other types of megaprojects show that cost overruns may, 
and often do, singlehandedly cause positive projected net benefits to become negative (Flyvbjerg 
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2016; Ansar, Flyvbjerg, and Budzier forthcoming). The most recent study of the economics of the 
Olympics, published in Journal of Economic Perspectives, found that "the overwhelming conclusion 
is that in most cases the Olympics are a money-losing proposition for host cities" (Baade and 
Matheson 2016: 202).  
 
In sum, we find for previous academic research on cost and cost overrun for the Olympic Games: 
 
1. Earlier attempts to specifically and systematically evaluate cost and cost overrun in the 
Games are few; 
2. Such attempts that exist are often focused on a specific Games or are small-sample research; 
3. Earlier research on the cost of the Games has focused on cost-benefit analysis, with debatable 
delimitations of costs and benefits making it difficult to compare results across studies and 
Games. 
 
Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) documented for the first time in a consistent and comparative fashion 
cost and cost overrun for a large number of Olympic Games. This study took its inspiration in 
comparative research more broadly looking at megaprojects and used a method for measuring cost 
and cost overrun that is the international standard in this research field. Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 
(2002), for example, provide an examination of rail, fixed-link (bridge and tunnel), and road projects, 
which finds that cost overruns are both prevalent and predictable, with average overruns of 45, 34, 
and 20 percent in real terms for each type of project, respectively. Their work has led to the 
development of a technique called "reference class forecasting" (Flyvbjerg 2008). Based on findings 
from behavioral economics, reference class forecasting develops budgets through a comparison with 
similar completed projects, rather than the bottom-up planning approach for each individual project 
that is commonly used. The reference class forecasting approach has been endorsed by the American 
Planning Association, and has been used in the UK, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, Denmark, and 
Switzerland, among others, to predict megaproject costs and benefits. Budzier and Flyvbjerg (2011) 
have confirmed similar results for major IT programs, as have Ansar et al. (2014) for large dams. 
Daniel Kahneman (2011: 251), Nobel Prize winner in economics, has called the use of reference class 
forecasting “the single most important piece of advice regarding how to increase accuracy in 
forecasting.” Drawing on these insights, the present research expands and updates Flyvbjerg and 
Stewart (2012) in an attempt to further develop our understanding of cost and cost overrun in the 
Olympic Games. 
 
Measuring Cost and Cost Overrun for the Olympics 
In the competition for hosting the Olympic Games cities pitch to the IOC and against each other their 
ideas for how to host the world’s biggest sporting event and how to generate significant urban 
development in the process (Andranovich, Burbank, and Heying 2001). To demonstrate their ability 
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to achieve these goals, bidding cities are required by the IOC to develop detailed plans in the form of 
so-called Candidature Files that are submitted to the Committee as part of the competition to host. 
The Candidature Files, or “bid books” as they are more commonly known, form part of the basis of 
the IOC’s decision for the next host city. 
  
One of the requirements for the bid book is that it includes a budget that details the expected 
investment by the host country's and city’s governments in the Games, in addition to a budget for 
expected revenues (IOC 2004). In their bid book, governments of candidate cities and countries are 
also required by the IOC to provide guarantees to “ensure the financing of all major capital 
infrastructure investments required to deliver the Olympic Games” and “cover a potential economic 
shortfall of the OCOG” (ibid: p 93). 
 
The Candidature File is a legally binding agreement, which states to citizens, decision makers, and the 
IOC how much it will cost to host the Games. As such the Candidature File represents the baseline 
from which future cost and cost overrun should be measured. If cost overrun later turns out to be zero, 
then decision makers made a well-informed decision in the sense that what they were told the Games 
would cost is what they actually cost, so they had the correct information to make their decision. If 
cost overrun is significantly higher than zero, then the decision was misinformed in the sense that it 
was based on an unrealistically low estimate of cost. However, such measurement of cost against a 
consistent and relevant baseline is rarely done. New budgets are typically developed after the Games 
were awarded, which are often substantially different to those presented at the bidding stage (Jennings 
2012). These new budgets are used as new baselines, rendering measurement of cost overrun 
inconsistent and misleading both within and between Games. Using later baselines typically makes 
cost overruns look smaller and this is a strong incentive for using them, as in the case for London 
2012 mentioned above. New budgets continue to evolve and develop over the course of the seven 
years of planning for the Games, until the final actual cost is perhaps presented, often several years 
after the Games’ completion, if at all, as we will see. 
  
In our effort to measure cost and cost overrun for the Games in a consistent and relevant manner, we 
searched for valid and reliable bid book and outturn cost data for both Summer and Winter Games, 
starting with the Rome 1960 Summer and Squaw Valley 1960 Winter Games, and continuing until the 
Sochi 2014 Winter and Rio 2016 Summer Games.  
 
Costs for hosting the Games fall into the following three categories, established by the IOC: 
 
1. Operational costs incurred by the Organising Committee for the purpose of “staging” the 
Games. The largest components of this budget are technology, transportation, workforce, 
and administration costs, while other costs include items like security, catering, 
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ceremonies, and medical services. These may be considered the variable costs of staging 
the Games and are formally called "OCOG costs" by the IOC. 
2. Direct capital costs incurred by the host city or country or private investors to build the 
competition venues, Olympic village(s), international broadcast center, and media and 
press center, which are required to host the Games. These are the direct capital costs of 
hosting the Games and are formally called "non-OCOG direct costs." 
3. Indirect capital costs such as for road, rail, or airport infrastructure, or for hotel upgrades 
or other business investment incurred in preparation for the Games but not directly 
related to staging the Games. These are wider capital costs and are formally called "non-
OCOG indirect costs." 
 
The first two items constitute the sports-related costs of the Games and are covered in the present 
analysis. Non-OCOG indirect costs have been omitted, because (1) data on such costs are rare, (2) 
where data are available, their validity and reliability typically do not live up to the standards of 
academic research, and (3) even where valid and reliable data exist, they are typically less comparable 
across cities and nations than sports-related costs, because there is a much larger element of 
arbitrariness in what is included in indirect costs than in what is included in sports-related costs. It 
should be remembered, however, that the indirect costs are often higher than the direct costs. Baade 
and Matheson (2016: 205) found that for seven Games for which they could obtain data for both 
sports infrastructure and general infrastructure, in all cases was the cost of general infrastructure 
higher than the cost of sports infrastructure, sometimes several times higher. 
 
Thus, our analysis compares each of OCOG costs and non-OCOG direct costs at two distinct points in 
time, bid budget and final outturn cost, for all Games since 1960 for which each of these four data 
points exist. This is 19 Games out of a total of 30 held between 1960 and 2016. For the remaining 11 
Games, valid and reliable data have not been reported that would make it possible to establish cost 
overrun for these Games. This is an interesting research result in its own right, because it means – 
incredible as it may sound – that for more than a third of the Games between 1960 and 2016 no one 
seems to know what the cost overrun was. Such ignorance – willful or not – hampers learning 
regarding how to develop more reliable budgets for the Games. From a rational point of view, 
learning would appear to be a self-evident objective for billion-dollar events like the Games, but often 
that is not the case. For some Games, hiding costs and cost overruns seems to have been more 
important, for whatever reason. 
 
Nevertheless, 19 out of 30 Games is 63 percent of all possible Games for the period under 
consideration (1960-2016), which we deem sufficient for producing interesting and relevant results. – 
We measured costs in both nominal and real (constant, not including inflation) terms, and in both 
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local currencies and US dollars. We followed international convention and made all comparisons 
across time and geographies in real terms, to ensure that like is compared with like. Further detail on 
methodology and how costs were converted from nominal to real terms is available in the Appendix 
below. 
 
Costs of the Olympic Games 1960-2016 
Table 1 shows actual outturn sports-related costs of the Olympic Games 1960-2016 together with the 
number of events and number of athletes in each Games.1 Data on outturn cost were available for 25 
out of the 30 Games 1960-2016. It should be mentioned that the Rio 2016 Summer Games had not yet 
been held at the time of writing the present paper. Preliminary data were therefore used for these 
Games.2 
 
The difference between cost for the Summer and Winter Games is statistically significant (W = 38, p 
= 0.02982).3 Costs for the Summer Games are significantly higher (median = USD 4.8 billion) than 
costs for the Winter Games (median = USD 2.0 billion). Costs for the two types of Games must 
therefore be considered separately in statistical terms. 
 
 
                                                     
1 The Paralympic Games are not included here because they have only become fully integrated with the Olympic Games 
relatively recently and therefore do not compare across the period we study here. 
2 The latest available forecast of the Rio 2016 cost was made public on January 29, 2016. We have reviewed the figures and 
sources and deemed them reliable. The forecast comprises the operational cost managed by the Rio 2016 Organising 
Committee (BRL 7.4 billion) and the direct capital cost managed by the Autoridade Pública Olímpica (BRL 7.1 billion). As 
described above, the indirect capital cost, which are also managed by the Autoridade Pública Olímpica (BRL 24.6 billion), 
have been omitted from the comparisons in this paper for all Games. 
3 Significance is here defined in the conventional manner, with p≤0.05 being significant, p≤0.01 very significant, and 
p≤0.001 overwhelmingly significant. These analyses include the Rio 2016 forecasted cost. 
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Table 1: Actual outturn sports-related costs of the Olympic Games 1960-2016, in 2015 USD 
Games Country Type Events Athletes Cost, billion 
USD 
Rome 1960 Italy Summer 150 5338 n/a 
Tokyo 1964 Japan Summer 163 5152 0.282 
Mexico City 1968 Mexico Summer 172 5516 n/a** 
Munich 1972 Germany Summer 195 7234 1.009 
Montreal 1976 Canada Summer 198 6048 6.093 
Moscow 1980 Soviet Union Summer 203 5179 6.331 
Los Angeles 1984 United States Summer 221 6829 0.719 
Seoul 1988 South Korea Summer 237 8397 n/a 
Barcelona 1992 Spain Summer 257 9356 9.687 
Atlanta 1996 United States Summer 271 10318 4.143 
Sydney 2000 Australia Summer 300 10651 5.026 
Athens 2004 Greece Summer 301 10625 2.942 
Beijing 2008 China Summer 302 10942 6.810 
London 2012 United Kingdom Summer 302 10568 14.957 
Rio 2016* Brazil Summer 306 10500 4.557 
Average - Summer 239 8177 5.213 
Median - Summer 237 8397 4.791 
Squaw Valley 1960 United States Winter 27 665 n/a 
Innsbruck 1964 Austria Winter 34 1091 0.022 
Grenoble 1968 France Winter 35 1158 0.888 
Sapporo 1972 Japan Winter 35 1006 0.117 
Innsbruck 1976 Austria Winter 37 1123 0.118 
Lake Placid 1980 United States Winter 38 1072 0.435 
Sarajevo 1984 Yugoslavia Winter 39 1272 n/a** 
Calgary 1988 Canada Winter 46 1432 1.109 
Albertville 1992 France Winter 57 1801 1.997 
Lillehammer 1994 Norway Winter 61 1737 2.228 
Nagano 1998 Japan Winter 68 2176 2.227 
Salt Lake City 2002 United States Winter 78 2399 2.520 
Torino 2006 Italy Winter 84 2508 4.366 
Vancouver 2010 Canada Winter 86 2566 2.540 
Sochi 2014 Russia Winter 98 2780 21.890 
Average - Winter 55 1652 3.112 
Median - Winter 46 1432 1.997 
Sources are listed under References.  *) Current projected Rio 2016 figures have been used.  
**) Mexican Peso and Yugoslavian dinar experienced hyperinflation during or after the Games. 
 
We see that the most expensive Summer Games to date are London 2012 at USD 15.0 billion and 
Barcelona 1992 at USD 9.7 billion. For the Winter Games, Sochi 2014 is the most costly at USD 21.9 
billion; Torino 2006 is the second-most costly at USD 4.4 billion. The least costly Summer Games are 
Tokyo 1964 at USD 282 million; the least costly Winter Games, Innsbruck 1964 at USD 22 million. It 
should again be remembered that wider capital costs (OCOG indirect costs) for urban and 
transportation infrastructure are not included in these numbers and that such costs are typically 
substantial. 
 
Average cost for Summer Games 1960-2016 is USD 5.2 billion. Average cost for Winter Games over 
the same period is US 3.1 billion. The large difference between average and median cost for the 
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Winter Games is mainly caused by the outlier of Sochi 2014 at USD 21.9 billion. Indeed, the Sochi 
2014 Winter Olympics are the most costly Games ever, even when compared with the Summer 
Games. This is extraordinary, given the fact that cost for the Winter Games is typically much lower 
than for the Summer Games, with the median cost for Winter Games being less than half the median 
cost for Summer Games.  
 
Figure 1 shows the development of cost 1960-2016. The trend lines indicate that the cost of the 
Games have increased over time. However, the apparent increase is statistically non-significant (p = 
0.764, Winter Olympics; p = 0.4473, Summer Olympics). In statistical terms, therefore, we can argue 
for neither an increase or a decrease in cost over time. 
 
Figure 1: Time series of cost for Olympics 1960-2016 
 
 
Table 2 shows cost per event and cost per athlete 1960-2016 in 2015 USD. These data were available 
for 25 of the 30 Games 1960-2016. The average cost per event for the Summer Games is USD 20 
million (median USD 16 million). For the Winter Games it is USD 39.2 million (median USD 30 
million). – The highest cost per event in the Summer Games was found for London 2012 at USD 50 
million followed by Barcelona at USD 38 million. For the Winter Games, the highest cost per event 
was found for Sochi at USD 223 million followed by Torino 2006 at USD 52 million. Again we see 
that Sochi 2014 is an extreme outlier. The lowest cost per event was found for Tokyo 1964 at USD 
1.7 million for the Summer games and Innsbruck 1964 at USD 0.6 million for the Winter Games. 
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Table 2: Cost per event and cost per athlete in the Olympics 1960-2016, million 2015 USD 
Games Country Type Cost per event, 
mio. USD 
Cost per athlete, 
mio. USD 
Tokyo 1964 Japan Summer 1.7 0.1 
Munich 1972 Germany Summer 5.2 0.1 
Montreal 1976 Canada Summer 30.8 1.0 
Moscow 1980 Soviet Union Summer 31.2 1.2 
Los Angeles 1984 United States Summer 3.3 0.1 
Barcelona 1992 Spain Summer 37.7 1.0 
Atlanta 1996 United States Summer 15.3 0.4 
Sydney 2000 Australia Summer 16.8 0.5 
Athens 2004 Greece Summer 9.8 0.3 
Beijing 2008 China Summer 22.5 0.6 
London 2012 United Kingdom Summer 49.5 1.4 
Rio 2016* Brazil Summer 14.9 0.4 
Average - Summer 19.9 0.6 
Median - Summer 16.0 0.5 
Innsbruck 1964 Austria Winter 0.6 0.02 
Grenoble 1968 France Winter 25.4 0.8 
Sapporo 1972 Japan Winter 3.4 0.1 
Innsbruck 1976 Austria Winter 3.2 0.1 
Lake Placid 1980 United States Winter 11.5 0.4 
Calgary 1988 Canada Winter 24.1 0.8 
Albertville 1992 France Winter 35.0 1.1 
Lillehammer 1994 Norway Winter 36.5 1.3 
Nagano 1998 Japan Winter 32.7 1.0 
Salt Lake City 2002 United States Winter 32.3 1.1 
Torino 2006 Italy Winter 52.0 1.7 
Vancouver 2010 Canada Winter 29.5 1.0 
Sochi 2014 Russia Winter 223.4 7.9 
Average - Winter 39.2 1.3 
Median - Winter 29.5 1.0 
Sources are listed under References.  *) Projected final Rio 2016 costs have been used. 
 
For cost per athlete, we found the Winter Games to be twice as costly as the Summer Games. The 
average cost per athlete is USD 599,000 for the Summer Games (median USD 453,000) and USD 1.3 
million for the Winter Games (median USD 990,000). However, the difference is statistically non-
significant (W = 97, p = 0.3203). The highest cost per athlete in the Summer Games was found for 
London 2012 at USD 1.4 million, followed by Moscow 1980 at USD 1.2 million.4 For the Winter 
Games, the highest cost per athlete was found for Sochi 2014 at USD 7.9 million and Torino 2006 at 
USD 1.7 million. The lowest cost per athlete in the Summer Games was found for Tokyo 1964 at 
USD 55,000, and in the Winter Games for Innsbruck 1964 at USD 20,000.  
                                                     
4 The Moscow 1980 Summer Games were boycotted by 65 nations as a protest against the 1979 Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. The number of participating athletes was therefore lower than anticipated, driving up 
cost per athlete. 
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Figure 2 shows the correlation of cost per athlete with time. We see a shift in trend from cost per 
athlete being generally higher for the Summer than for the Winter Games until the mid 1980's, after 
which the Winter Games become more costly than the Summer Games, in terms of cost per athlete. 
We also see that cost per athlete was generally decreasing for the Summer Games from the mid-
1980's until the early noughties, after which cost per athlete has been increasing for both the Summer 
and Winter Games, driven mainly by London 2012 and Sochi 2014. Overall, however, the changes 
over time are statistically non-significant for both Summer Games (p = 0.4762), Winter Games (p = 
0.1523), and all Games (p = 0.5399). 
 
Figure 2: Time series of cost per athlete for Olympics 1960-2016, with and without outlier 
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Cost Overrun at the Games 
Table 3 shows percentage cost overrun in real terms for the Olympic Games 1960-2016. Data on cost 
overrun were available for 19 of the 30 Games 1960-2016. Statistical tests of the difference between 
bid budgets and final costs show this difference to be statistically overwhelmingly significant (V = 
190, p < 0.0001). That is to say, cost overruns are overwhelmingly manifest for the Olympics, in 
statistical terms. – It should be mentioned that if the cost overruns had been calculated in nominal 
terms (including inflation) they would have been significantly larger. In this sense the numbers shown 
are conservative. 
 
Table 3: Sports-related cost overruns, Olympics 1960-2016; calculated in local currencies, 
real terms 
Games Country Type Cost overrun % 
Montreal 1976 Canada Summer 720 
Barcelona 1992 Spain Summer 266 
Atlanta 1996 United States Summer 151 
Sydney 2000 Australia Summer 90 
Athens 2004 Greece Summer 49 
Beijing 2008 China Summer 2 
London 2012 United Kingdom Summer 76 
Rio 2016* Brazil Summer 51 
Average  - Summer 176 
Median  - Summer 83 
Grenoble 1968 France Winter 181 
Lake Placid 1980 United States Winter 324 
Sarajevo 1984 Yugoslavia Winter 118 
Calgary 1988 Canada Winter 65 
Albertville 1992 France Winter 137 
Lillehammer 1994 Norway Winter 277 
Nagano 1998 Japan Winter 56 
Salt Lake City 2002 United States Winter 24 
Torino 2006 Italy Winter 80 
Vancouver 2010 Canada Winter 13 
Sochi 2014 Russia Winter 289 
Average  - Winter 142 
Median  - Winter 118 
Sources are listed under References.  *) Projected final Rio 2016 costs have been used 
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We find the following averages and medians for cost overrun in real terms: 
 
 All Games: average cost overrun is 156 percent (median 90 percent).  
 Summer Games: average cost overrun is 176 percent (median 83 percent).  
 Winter Games: average cost overrun is 142 percent (median 118 percent).  
 
Even though the difference between average cost overrun for the Summer and Winter Games is 
relatively large at 34 percentage points, the difference between the two types of Games in terms of 
cost overrun is statistically non-significant (W = 49, p = 0.7168). In statistical terms there is therefore 
no difference between cost overrun in the Summer and Winter Games and the data may be pooled for 
statistical analyses, for instance in making more accurate reference class forecasts of budgets for 
future Olympic Games (Flyvbjerg 2008).  
 
We further see that: 
 
 15 of 19 Games (79 percent) have cost overruns above 50 percent. 
 9 of 19 Games (47 percent) have cost overruns above 100 percent. 
 
Judging from these statistics it is clear that large risks of large cost overruns are inherent to the 
Olympic Games.  
 
For the Summer Games, the largest cost overrun was found for Montreal 1976 at 720 percent, 
followed by Barcelona 1992 at 266 percent. The smallest cost overrun for the Summer Games was 
found for Beijing 2008 at two percent, followed by Athens 2004 at 49 percent. For the Winter Games, 
the largest cost overruns are Lake Placid 1980 at 324 percent followed by Sochi 2014 at 289 percent. 
The smallest cost overrun for the Winter Games was found for Vancouver 2010 at 13 percent, 
followed by Salt Lake City 2002 at 24 percent.  
 
The vigilant reader may be skeptical that the lowest cost overrun of all Games was found for Beijing 
2008 at two percent. China is known for its lack of reliability in economic reporting (Koch-Weser 
2013). However, the total cost of USD 6.8 billion and the cost per athlete of USD 622,000 for the 
Beijing 2008 Games are both higher than for the majority of other Summer Games (see Tables 1 and 
2). The reported costs are therefore deemed adequate for hosting the Beijing Games and we have seen 
no direct evidence that the official numbers have been manipulated and should be rejected for this 
reason. Like other observers of economic data from China we therefore include the numbers, with the 
caveat that they are possibly less reliable than numbers from other nations, given China's history of 
doctoring data. Again, this means that our averages for cost overrun in the Olympic Games are 
conservative. 
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We further observe about cost overrun in the Olympic Games, based on the data presented above: 
 
1. All Games, without exception, have cost overrun. For no other type of megaproject is this the 
case. For other project types, typically 10-20 percent of projects come in on or under budget. 
For the Olympics it is zero percent. It is worth considering this point carefully. A budget is 
typically established as the maximum – or, alternatively, the expected – value to be spent on a 
project. However, in the Games the budget is more like a fictitious minimum that is 
consistently overspent. Further, even more than in other megaprojects, each budget is 
established with a legal requirement for the host city and country government to guarantee 
that they will cover the cost overruns of the Games. Our data suggest the guarantee is akin to 
writing a blank check for the event, with certainty that the cost will be more than what has 
been quoted. In practice, the bid budget is really more of a down payment than it is a budget, 
with further installments to be paid later. 
 
2. The Olympic Games have the highest average cost overrun of any type of megaproject, at 
156 percent in real terms. In comparison, Flyvbjerg et al (2002) found average cost overruns 
in major transportation projects of 20 percent for roads, 34 percent for large bridges and 
tunnels, and 45 percent for rail; Ansar et al. (2014) found 90 percent overrun for megadams; 
and Budzier and Flyvbjerg (2011) 107 percent for major IT projects, all in real terms (see 
Table 4). The high cost overrun for the Games may be related to the fixed deadline for project 
delivery: the opening date cannot be moved. Therefore, when problems arise there can be no 
trade-off between schedule and cost, as is common for other megaprojects. All that managers 
can do at the Olympics is throw more money at problems, which is what happens. This is the 
blank check, again.  
 
3. The high average cost overrun for the Games, combined with the existence of outliers, should 
be cause for caution for anyone considering hosting the Games, and especially small or 
fragile economies with little capacity to absorb escalating costs and related debts. Even a 
small risk of a 50+ percent cost overrun on a multi-billion dollar project should concern 
government officials and taxpayers when a guarantee to cover cost overrun is imposed, 
because such overrun may have fiscal implications for decades to come, as happened with 
Montreal where it took 30 years to pay off the debt incurred by the 720 percent cost overrun 
on the 1976 Summer Games (Vigor, Mean, and Tims 2004: 18), and Athens 2004 where 
Olympic cost overruns and related debt exacerbated the 2007-16 financial and economic 
crises, as mentioned above (Flyvbjerg 2011).  
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Table 4: The Olympic Games have the largest cost overrun of any type of large-scale project, real 
terms 
 Roads Bridges, 
tunnels 
Energy Rail Dams IT Olympics 
Cost overrun 20% 34% 36% 45% 90% 107% 156% 
Frequency of 
cost overrun 
9 of 10 9 of 10 6 of 10 9 of 10 7 of 10 5 of 10 10 of 10 
Schedule 
overrun 
38% 23% 38% 45% 44% 37% 0% 
Schedule 
length, years 
5.5 8.0 5.3 7.8 8.2 3.3 7.0 
 
 
Does the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program Work? Has Cost Overrun 
Come Down Over Time? 
If, perversely, one would want to make it as difficult as possible to deliver a megaproject to budget, 
then one would (1) make sure that those responsible for delivering the project had never delivered this 
type of project before, (2) place the project in a location that had never seen such a project, or at least 
not for the past few decades so that any lessons learned earlier would have been forgotten, and (3) 
enforce a non-transparent and corrupt bidding process that would encourage overbidding and 
"winner's curse" and place zero responsibility for costs with the entity that would decide who wins the 
bid.5 This, unfortunately, is a fairly accurate description of the playbook for the Olympic Games, as 
they move from nation to nation and city to city, forcing hosts into a role of "eternal beginners." It is 
also a further explanation of why the Games hold the record for the highest cost overrun of any type 
of megaproject, as shown above.6 
 
During the 1990's, the IOC began to see that more effective knowledge transfer between host cities 
might be a way to counter the "eternal beginner" syndrome. The Committee therefore initiated what 
has become known as the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program, which is a knowledge-
transfer program aimed at increasing efficiency in delivering the Games by having new host cities and 
nations learn from earlier ones. The key ingredients in the program are, first, a platform of relevant, 
accumulated knowledge and services that hosts can draw on and, second, a program to have people 
who will be responsible for future Games participate as trainees and observers at previous ones.  
 
                                                     
5 The "winner's curse" says that in auctions with incomplete information the winner will tend to overpay and 
will therefore be worse off than anticipated by winning the bid. On corruption in the Games, see Transparency 
International (2016). 
6 Recently, proposals have been made to host the Olympic Games in one or a few permanent locations, or, 
alternatively, that two successive Games should be given to the same host, so facilities could be used twice 
(Short 2015, Baade and Matheson 2016).  
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Like for knowledge-transfer programs in general, the purpose of the Olympic Games Knowledge 
Management Program is to facilitate and support organizational learning. As observed by Schön 
(1994: 69), learning can only be said to take place if performance improves over time. "Performance 
that deteriorates, regresses, or merely swings from one mode of action to another does not qualify as 
learning," according to Schön. In the context of cost, improved performance would mean a reduction 
in cost risk – i.e., cost overrun – over time. If the data show such reduction, they support that learning 
is taking place and that the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program therefore works in this 
respect. If the data show no reduction in overruns, one would have to conclude that no learning is 
taking place and that the Program therefore does not work, as regards cost and cost overrun.  
 
The Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program was first used from the mid 1990's in 
preparing for the Sydney 2000 Summer Games and has been used for Games since then. We therefore 
decided to compare cost overruns for the Games before 1999 (i.e., before Sydney 2000) with overruns 
after 1999 (i.e., from, and including, Sydney 2000). For the first few years after 1999 it was 
impossible to do this comparison in a statistically valid manner because the Games happen only every 
two years and as a consequence too few observations existed. This situation has now improved with 
nine Games with valid data on cost overrun after 1999, compared with ten before 1999.  
 
Table 5 shows these data. Eyeballing the table we see that there appears to be a difference in cost 
overruns for the Games before and after 1999. Median cost overrun for Games before 1999 was 166 
percent, compared with 51 percent after 1999. Statistical test shows the difference to be statistically 
significant (W = 76, p = 0.0101). Cost risks appear to have come down after the Olympic Games 
Knowledge Management Program began. It should be emphasized, however, that the number of 
observations are few and variation large. The result of the statistical analysis is therefore sensitive to 
even small changes in the basic data. For instance, just one or two future Games with triple-digit cost 
overruns would render the result insignificant and the Knowledge Management Program ineffective, 
from a statistical point of view. The IOC would therefore be well advised to ensure that the Program 
is rigorously enforced going forward and to not allow repetition of outlier cost overruns like that of 
Sochi 2014. 
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Table 5: Sports-related cost overrun in the Games pre-1999 and post-1999, real terms. The difference 
is statistically significant (p = 0.0101). 
Pre-1999 Games % cost overrun Post-1999 Games % cost overrun 
Grenoble 1968 181 Sydney 2000 90 
Montreal 1976 720 Salt Lake City 2002 24 
Lake Placid 1980 324 Athens 2004 49 
Sarajevo 1984 118 Torino 2006 80 
Calgary 1988 65 Beijing 2008 2 
Albertville 1992 137 Vancouver 2010 13 
Barcelona 1992 266 London 2012 76 
Lillehammer 1994 277 Sochi 2014 289 
Atlanta 1996 151 Rio 2016* 51 
Nagano 1998 56 - - 
Average 230 Average 75 
Median 166 Median 51 
Sources are listed under References.  *) Projected final Rio 2016 costs have been used. 
 
Figure 3 shows how cost overrun has developed over time. It appears there was a general trend of 
falling cost overruns even before the Sydney 2000 Games and that this continued until Beijing 2008 
and Vancouver 2010, after which the trend was reversed, first by London 2012 and then further 
reinforced by the high overrun for Sochi 2014.  
 
Figure 3: Development of cost overrun at the Olympic Games over time, real terms 
 
 
Rio 2016 Compared with Previous Games 
The Rio 2016 Summer Games had not yet been held at the time of writing the present paper, as 
mentioned above. The latest projected cost, from January 2016, are therefore used for Rio, until such 
a time when final outturn cost will be available. Using these data, we find a preliminary cost for the 
Rio Games at USD 4.6 billion and a cost overrun of 51 percent in real terms. 
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Table 6 compares the Rio 2016 Olympic Summer Games with previous Summer Games for the four 
key cost variables considered in this paper.  
 
Table 6: Cost and cost overrun for Rio 2016 compared with previous Summer Games 
Item Rio 2016* Median, Summer Games** 
Cost, billion USD 2015 4.6  5.0  
Cost overrun, % real terms 50.6  89.7  
Cost per event, mio. USD 2015 14.9  16.8  
Cost per athlete, mio. USD 2015 0.4  0.5  
*) The current projected figures for the Rio 2016 Games have been used.  **) Excluding Rio 2016. 
 
We see that for total sports-related outturn cost, the Rio 2016 Games are just below the median cost of 
all other Summer Games, which is USD 5.0 billion. The difference is non-significant, however (V = 
37, p = 0.7646). We therefore conclude that the Rio 2016 Games are similar to other Summer Games 
in terms of cost. 
 
For cost overrun, at 51 percent the Rio Games are lower than the median for other Summer Games, 
but again the difference is not statistically significant (V = 23, p = 0.156). Rio's overrun is identical to 
median overrun for Games since 1999 (see Table 5), but is less than the overruns for the most recent 
Games in London and Sochi. 
 
Measured by cost per event, the Rio 2016 Games – at USD 14.9 million – are slightly lower than the 
median cost per event of previous Summer Games at USD 16.8 million. But cost per event for Rio 
2016 is not statistically significantly different than cost per event for previous Summer Games (V = 
45, p = 0.3203). 
 
Finally, for cost per athlete, the Rio Games – at USD 0.4 million – are again slightly lower than the 
cost per athlete of previous Summer Games at USD 0.5 million. And again the difference is 
statistically non-significant (V = 44, p = 0.3652). 
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In sum, we find for the Rio 2016 Olympic Summer Games, based on the current projected cost figures 
for Rio: 
 
1. At USD 4.6 billion, the Rio Games appear to be on track to reverse the high expenditures of 
London 2012 and Sochi 2014 and deliver a Summer Games at the median cost for such 
Games. 
2. At 51 percent in real terms, Rio 2016 seems on track to incur a substantial cost overrun of 
USD 1.6 billion. This is less than the overruns for the most recent Games in London and 
Sochi, but the same as median overrun for Games since 1999.  
3. At USD 0.4 million per athlete, Rio is on track to deliver its Games at a cost per athlete 
similar to previous Summer Games and substantially lower than both London 2012 and Sochi 
2014. 
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Appendix: Research Methodology 
To investigate the question of cost and cost overrun at the Olympic Games, we conducted an extended 
search of all cost data available. We collected data on two cost components for the Games: the OCOG 
cost and non-OCOG direct costs. For these two components, costs at bid were determined mainly 
through primary data from the OCOG Candidature Files. Final OCOG costs were found chiefly in the 
Official Reports submitted to the IOC following each Games. Where primary sources were not 
available, secondary sources including audits and other research data were used, with primary sources 
taking precedence over secondary sources where available.  
 
Using these data, we then proceeded with cost comparisons. For calculating cost overrun, we 
compared the actual outturn cost with the estimated cost in the bid year, both listed in local currency 
and calculated in real terms. To control for inflation over the period from bid to reporting of final 
outturn costs, we adjusted the cost data using local GDP deflator values to adjust the cost in local 
currency to the bid year, using a distribution of costs over the seven years of Games planning based 
on known expenditure profiles of OCOG costs and non-OCOG direct costs. The numbers for cost 
overrun arrived at in this manner are conservative, in the sense that they would be substantially larger 
had inflation been included. Finally, for cost comparisons in 2015 US dollars, we used the same local 
GDP deflator values  (World Bank 2016a) to inflate the nominal bid and final cost data in the year in 
which it was incurred to 2015 in local currency, and then used World Bank national currency unit 
(NCU) values (World Bank 2016b) to convert the data from 2015 local currency to USD 2015.  
 
We next conducted a number of statistical tests to understand the differences present in the data. 
Table 7 shows the hypotheses tested, the methods used, and the results found. 
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Table 7: Hypotheses tested, methods used, and results found in the Oxford Olympics Study 
Hypothesis Data Test used Result 
Median cost are 
different between 
Summer and Winter 
Olympics 
Actual cost in 2015 USD 
terms 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test 
W = 38, 
p = 0. 02982 
 
Cost of Summer 
Olympics are stationary 
Actual cost in 2015 USD 
terms 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller =  
-2.3284, p = 0.4473 
Cost of Winter 
Olympics are stationary 
Actual cost in 2015 USD 
terms 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller =  
-1.4969, p = 0.764 
Cost per athlete are 
different between 
Summer and Winter 
Olympics 
Actual cost in 2015 USD 
terms per athlete 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test 
W = 97, 
P = 0.3203 
Cost per athlete of 
Summer Olympics are 
stationary 
Actual cost in 2015 USD 
terms per athlete 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller =  
-2.2525, p = 0.4762 
Cost per athlete of 
Winter Olympics are 
stationary 
Actual cost in 2015 USD 
terms per athlete 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller =  
-3.1027, p = 0.1523 
Cost per athlete are 
stationary 
Actual cost in 2015 USD 
terms per athlete 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller =  
-2.0852, p = 0.5399 
Cost overruns center 
around 0% 
Actual/estimated cost, 
local currencies, real 
terms 
Wilcoxon signed 
rank test 
V = 190, 
p < 0.0001 
Cost overruns are no 
different between 
Summer and Winter 
Olympics 
Actual/estimated cost, 
local currencies, real 
terms 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test 
W = 49,  
p = 0.7168 
Cost overruns are no 
different post/pre-1999 
Actual/estimated cost, 
local currencies, real 
terms 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test 
W = 76, 
p = 0.01013 
Rio 2016 outturn cost 
are similar to previous 
Summer Olympics 
Actual cost, 2015 USD, 
real terms 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test 
V = 37,  
p = 0.7646 
Rio 2016 outturn cost 
are similar to previous 
Olympics 
Actual cost, 2015 USD, 
real terms 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test 
V = 91,  
p  = 0.0951 
Rio 2016 cost overrun is 
similar to previous 
Summer Olympics 
Actual/estimated cost, 
local currencies, real 
terms 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test 
V = 23,  
p = 0.1563 
Rio 2016 cost overrun is 
similar to previous 
Olympics 
Actual/estimated cost, 
local currencies, real 
terms 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test 
V = 149,  
p = 0.004005 
Rio 2016 cost per event 
are similar to previous 
Summer Olympics  
Actual cost per event, 
2015 USD, real terms 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test 
V = 45,  p = 0.3203 
Rio 2016 cost per athlete 
are similar to previous 
Summer Olympics  
Actual/estimated cost, 
local currencies, real 
terms 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank test 
V = 44,  p = 0.3652 
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